Executive Summary i U.S. National Security Strategy identifies the Global Commons as shared sea, air, and space domains which exist outside of exclusive national jurisdiction. Cyberspace, as yet a nascent domain, may be evolving into a new Global Commons as it acquires the five distinguishing characteristics such domains share: (1) each are governed by international treaties; (2) these treaties address specific permissible uses and prohibitions; (3) each treaty specifically addresses the issue of sovereignty; (4) each treaty bounds or defines areas of sovereignty and thus areas that constitute the global commons and (5) states could not realistically expect to exercise sovereignty over these areas when they established these treaties. The international regimes created by these treaties are voluntary affairs and states accept their constraints primarily to preserve their future interests when they lack the capability to exert control or enforce a sovereignty claim. Such is the present condition of the high seas (and the airspace above them), the Antarctic and outer space.
However, the history of territorial seas and more recently the claims in the Arctic have shown that global commons and their governing regimes are not immutable. On the contrary, technological progress, resource scarcity and most recently, climate change, are making global commons more accessible and more desirable. The result is inexorable pressure for states to expand their sovereignty into the global commons. To do so, states must fundamentally be able to demonstrate sustained presence and possess the capability to act within the domain. In this regard the United States is well positioned in the maritime and Antarctic domains but considerably less so in the Arctic and, perhaps surprisingly, in outer space. Beyond these key enablers however, there exists no formal process to transition international regimes to recognized sovereignty claims, therefore states must undertake the essential activity of engagement in order to preserve their interests among the regime stakeholders and be properly positioned to affect an expansion of national sovereignty into a global commons. This paper advocates a holistic approach, advancing a campaign plan for the global commons with the following lines of effort:
 Engage in the maritime regime  Support Arctic engagement organizations  Take a holistic approach to engagement with Canada  Realign COCOM boundaries in the North  Step up engagement with Greenland  Engage non-traditional partners  Re-assign COCOM responsibilities in the South  Lead the reshaping of the Antarctic international regime  Shift our posture on space regimes  Establish a national space objective that serves a broad array of strategic interests
Deriving a Campaign Plan for the Global Commons
Technological progress, resource scarcity, and climate change are converging to create a situation in which the commercial exploitation of the deep ocean, the polar regions and space is economically viable. National claims to these regions are at present non-existent or unrecognized however experience in littoral waters and current events in the Arctic suggest that a clash over claims is inevitable. There is no accepted procedure for turning such claims into sovereignty; history has shown that success results from the ability to demonstrate presence, capability and engagement. If this indeed is a zero-sum game, we can ill afford short-sighted and fractured policy-making, especially in the face of ambitious competitors. To wage a prolonged campaign of this nature requires strategic resource planning aligned to a clear vision. Our newest strategic guidance makes the strongest statement yet in this regard, "To safeguard U.S.
and partner nations interests, we will be prepared to demonstrates the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation's actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace. . . ." 1 But this remains a reactionary posture and as such, is insufficient to enable our desires. To properly position the United States for sovereignty expansion into the remaining global commons, our strategic vision must acknowledge its likelihood and pro-actively guide our actions to peacefully reshape these international regimes.
Global Commons are distinct domains periodically challenged by sovereignty claims
The U.S. National Security Strategy identifies the shared sea, air, and space domains, "which exist outside the exclusive national jurisdiction" 2 as the global commons. Considered from the perspective of resources, global commons are domains which contain subtractable resources managed under a property regime in which a legally defined user pool cannot be efficiently excluded from the domain. Those resources may be natural, having economic or social value when extracted from their natural state, or spatial-extension resources that have value because of their location (e.g. geostationary orbits or Lagrange Points). Second, each of these treaties addresses specific permissible uses and prohibitions for the natural asset. The Antarctic Treaty states, in part, that nations can only use the Antarctic for peaceful purposes, including scientific research, and specifically prohibits nations from testing nuclear weapons or disposing nuclear waste in the Antarctic. Similarly, the Outer Space Treaty states, in part, that nations can only use the moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, including scientific research, and prohibits nations from launching any nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction into orbit. Finally, the Law of the Sea covers a broad range of issues ranging from a nation's transit rights, to a nation's ability to lay submarine cables and pipeline, to a nation's fishing rights on the high seas.
Third, each of the treaties specifically addresses the issue of sovereignty. The Antarctic Treaty states, "No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the treaty is in force." The Outer Space Treaty states, "Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." Finally, the Law of the Sea states, "no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty" and "no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part" of the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction "or its resources." Fourth, each treaty bounds, or defines, areas of sovereignty and thus areas that constitute the global commons. Under the Antarctic Treaty, the global commons is defined as "south of 60° South Latitude, including all ice shelves." The Law of the Sea has a myriad of provisions precisely defining areas that constitute territorial waters where a state has sovereignty as well as other areas of state interest such as an exclusive economic zone, thereby generally leaving the remaining oceans as a global commons (see Appendix A, Figure 1 ). Finally, under the Outer Space Treaty, the global commons essentially constitutes all of "outer space, including the Moon and other natural celestial bodies," although there is no specific definition of outer space provided in the Outer Space Treaty and thus no clear line between airspace and outer space.
Finally, states could not realistically expect to exercise sovereignty over these areas when they established these treaties. Even if a nation wanted to assert sovereignty over the entirety of the oceans, outer space, or the Antarctic, no nation realistically could exert control or enforce its sovereignty over the entirety of these natural assets 5 . This last characteristic is perhaps key to understanding why these commons persist today since, "historically, human response to vast areas of valuable resources unfettered by legal rights recognized by the dominant culture usually has been appropriation by governments and individuals, followed by exploitation as soon and as rapidly as physical force and technology would permit."
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In a seminal article first published in 1968, Garrett Hardin addressed this reality coupled with the finite limits of our natural and concluded that this "tragedy of the commons" was fundamentally a moral dilemma that could only be managed by legislating and regulating temperance.
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The global commons as they exist today, namely Antarctica, the high seas, the deep seabed, the atmosphere and space, "have remained exceptions only because access to them has been difficult and the value of the resources they contain has not been enough to justify the effort of acquiring them. Today however, technology has caught up with desire." The U.S. military has come to recognize this growing importance of the global commons and has identified it as an essential battlefield in which aggression must be deterred or defeated.
Joint assured access to the global commons and cyberspace constitutes a core aspect of U.S. national security and remains an enduring mission for the Joint Force. The global commons and globally connect domains constitute the connective tissue upon which all nations' security and prosperity depend. The maritime domain enables the bulk of the joint force's forward deployment and sustainment, as well as the commerce that underpins the global economic system. The interlinked domains of air, space, and cyberspace allow for the high-speed, high-volume exchange of people, ideas, goods, information and capital that are equally critical to the global economy. These collective domains are essential and interdependent mediums for the Joint Force's projection and sustainment of power and ability to deter and defeat aggression.
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Unfortunately this declaration of fundamental importance and commitment to defense fails to describe the long-term, ongoing, Phase 0 shaping activities that must be undertaken to effectively manage our position, safeguard our interests and ultimately ensure our objectives using a whole of government approach and all the tools of national power. Nominally such activities are captured in a Theater Campaign Plan, however the Global Commons transcend theaters yet require a unified national approach. Deriving a campaign plan for such domains must therefore consider them in totality within the context of the global community of nations.
International regimes are created in global commons that are currently beyond the reach of sustainable sovereignty claims "There is no central sovereign at the international level. The United Nations is a deliberative body; its members are instructed by their national governments and must return to their national governments for approval of decisions. Enforcement is also left to the individual member states."
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Thus international regimes are voluntary creations; constraints that states are willing to accept primarily as a means of preserving some rights when it is otherwise beyond their ability to exert control. In Hardin's construct, because freedom in the commons brings ruin to all, we mutually institute and accept "coercive devices" to escape the horror of the commons.
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In those domains where international regimes currently apply, the guidance to U.S. military forces is quite clear. "The Joint Force will adhere to conventions, laws, and regulations our Nation supports to underpin collective security and govern conduct. We will also facilitate cooperation in the commons and cyberspace . . . as part of our theater strategies."
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No suggestion is made however for creating a unified strategy for the global commons that would address activities to guide the transition from current status quo to desired end state for U.S. interests. The evolution of international regimes and sovereignty claims in the global commons is not a defined process.
"When states and individuals started developing the technological capability to enter the domains of sea, air, and outer space, strong arguments existed for each of these domains to remain free from sovereign control. However, state interests, such as trade and national security, combined 10 Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 9. 11 Buck, The Global Commons, 24 . 12 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", 1247. 13 Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 9. with a state's technological capabilities, ultimately prevailed over these arguments and determined the current legal status of these domains."
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In Roman times, the seas and the fish in it were considered common to all mankind. Following the collapse of the Roman empire and rise of city-states and merchant empires there was a practical need to exert sovereignty in order to protect commercial claims, fisheries and collect tariffs. By the 17th century, ". . . the principle that finally became accepted was that national jurisdiction extended only as far as a nation could enforce its control from shore. Beyond artillery range the high seas were open to all. This principle rested more on practical considerations than on elegant expositions of legal principles.
The boundary of territorial seas eventually evolved into one marine league, or three miles. This was the distance used by the United States in 1793 when it defined its neutral coastal area during the war between Great Britain and France."
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Three miles became the international standard as it was recognized by Great Britain, the preeminent naval power until World War II. Following the war, growing recognition of offshore oil reserves and the age-old dispute over fishing rights that led to repeated confrontation between Iceland and Great Britain prompted negotiations that ultimately produced one of the most comprehensive international regimes, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III).
During UNCLOS III a consensus was reached in which the nations agreed on a range of territorial seas. A 12-mile limit for the right of innocent passage was set, but straits less than 24 miles wide were to be governed not as territorial waters but by a new regime of "transit passage". Beyond this 12-mile limit, coastal states had a monopoly on fish and living resources to the 200-mile limit and on energy sources and minerals to 350 miles. This enclosed 36 percent of the world's oceans, including 90 percent of commercially exploitable fish and 87 percent of projected offshore oil reserves. 16 Driven by resources that had become economically viable both through increasing scarcity and technological progress, sovereignty into the global commons of the oceans expanded from three to 350 miles. Practically speaking, what makes such claims sustainable is the ability of a nation to exert their presence. "In effect, the nations now have very long cannons." 17 Through engagement with other nations, international regimes are created that recognize the expanded national claims, however nations must also possess the possess the capability to enforce such 14 Franzese, "Sovereignty in Cyberspace," 14. 15 Buck, The Global Commons, 81 . 16 Buck, The Global Commons, 86 . 17 Buck, The Global Commons, 100. claims in order for international regimes to remain stable. "The lack of resources to obtain adequate forces, combined with national sovereignty that does not willingly cede responsibility for security within territorial waters, creates ungoverned maritime spaces that foster threats." 18 Indeed, if there is any true "white space" to speak of in the maritime domain, it is these unsecured territorial waters which spawn the principle threats to the international regime today.
From the time of the Romans, until the advent of aerial machines, it has been generally accepted that a landowner has the right to use the air above his property. Thus the age of flight, which matured rapidly due to World War I both ended the common notion of private ownership of the air and highlighted the need to resolve the question of airspace sovereignty. Disparate attempts to apply maritime conventions such as territorial zones or innocent passage failed (sometimes fatally) until the issue was finally agreed upon in 1919 at the Convention of Aerial Navigation in France.
Commonly known as the Paris Convention, this convention codified the existing customary international law of air sovereignty. Article 1 stated, in part, "The high contracting parties recognize that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." Equally as important, the Convention nominally established the idea that states had the right of innocent passage across the airspace and above the territory of other states. This fundamental concept of air sovereignty continued, specifically with the Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly referred to as the Chicago Convention, which states first signed in 1944 and have updated eight times, most recently in 2006. Regardless of how the Convention changed over the years, Article I of the Chicago Convention has consistently stated, " [t] he contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty above its territory." However, the Chicago Convention does not recognize the right of innocent passage as set forth in the Paris Convention. Nonetheless, the Chicago Convention does address such matters as over-flight rights and aircraft nationality, and also established the International Civil Aviation Organization to govern these issues.
regimes alone is not enough to sustain a sovereign claim. Nothing quite so clearly demonstrates the essentiality of presence and capability to sustain a sovereignty claim as the surface-to-air missiles that futilely fell short of U.S. U-2 aircraft flying over the USSR in the 1950's. Over the years, as technology has allowed nations to attain and control ever higher altitudes the informal notion of the bounds of sovereign airspace has expanded from the height of air-breathing engines to the lowest sustainable satellite orbit. Nor has the notion of sovereignty ended there. Despite the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and just four years after it went into force, " . . CHM defines some resources . . . as the property of the global human population. CHM proponents then argue that since a community (albeit a large one) already holds most of the bundle the property rights to the resources, the resources cannot legally be appropriated by any one individual or state. The benefits from their exploitation should be shared by all states (and presumably distributed to the people) regardless of the state's participation in resource extraction. The CHM principle originated from two realizations in the international community. First, some valuable natural resource stocks, such as certain fisheries, are close to exhaustion. The developing countries are eager to ensure that the resources remain available for their own use, and the common heritage principle gives moral force to their arguments. Second, the developing nations were concerned that the first-come-first-served rule would be to their disadvantage in regimes such as deep seabed mining and outer space. The CHM was an assertion of their right to participate in exploitation and a moral claim to the development assistance needed for participation.
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On July 20, 1969, humans first set foot upon the Moon and notably, the United States did not claim territorial sovereignty. It could be regarded as validation of the CHM principle inherent in the Outer Space Treaty. Alternatively, an overt statement of sovereignty might have been 21 Buck, The Global Commons, 157 . 22 Buck, The Global Commons, avoided in recognition that U.S. presence was going to be fleeting and future capability to reach the moon, highly questionable. As early as January 1970, the Apollo program was being truncated with no follow-on plans to return to the moon, thus sovereignty claims would become impossible to maintain through commonly established precedents. On Earth, the CHM principle has not held up in the face of economic pressure or challenged by national interest. The seabed mineral regime was modified in 1994 to satisfy developed nations─those that could reasonably by expected to accomplish such extraction in the near future. "In the Antarctic, the consultative parties . . . have resisted any application of the CHM principle. They assert, quite logically, that numerous claims of territorial sovereignty have already been made in the resource domain. The treaty has merely set the disputes aside while scientific research continues." Yet, as the sovereignty drama in the Arctic has unfolded, it has become clear that economic ambition is more likely to push governments to peaceful agreements in order to hasten resource extraction. "So far, concerns about the security of drilling licenses have discouraged oil and gas exploration in areas of disputed sovereignty. But Big Oil, which is willing to deal with just about any government, is starting to push for agreed-upon boundaries. Governments, realizing that clear jurisdiction is a prerequisite for large-scale investment, are beginning to respond." Top leaders in the U.S., initially slow to acknowledge climate change, have now made it a key trend impacting our national security. "The danger from climate change is real, urgent, and
It is already having a tremendous impact on the polar regions of our planet; changing the economic equation by simplifying access and renewing debates over sovereignty. "Every Arctic-specific policy imperative, whether on sovereignty, security, shipping or search-andrescue, is driven by the need to adapt to the increasingly severe consequences of climate change." Climate change is also disrupting the food web that jeopardizes the viability of traditional Inuit civilization, while at the same time enhancing the economic productivity of Greenland which in turn encourages ambitions of independence. The sum of all such developments must be considered together when assessing the future security of North America and should serve as a guide for our security cooperation efforts.
Where are the simultaneous pressures of resource scarcity, technological progress and climate change likely to drive us in the future? Using the most conservative or favorable current projections of population, GDP growth, and improvements in energy efficiency, the world energy demand in 2050 will be twice what it is today. Fossil fuels will still make up 80% of the energy mix in the 2030s, with oil and gas comprising upwards of 60%. Assuming the most optimistic scenario for improved petroleum production and new discoveries, petroleum production will be hard pressed to meet the expected future demand of 118 million barrels per day in 2030. If sufficient plants did exist, it's questionable whether adequate uranium could be obtained to run them, requiring extensive use of re-processing and plutonium.
Controlled fusion could solve many fuel and waste issues but it has yet to be technically achieved and will not mature in time to meet this demand. Hydroelectric sources are about tapped out and the potential that resides in wind, geothermal, tidal, and even biomass simply does not scale sufficiently to meet this power need. The Sun is the only natural energy resource that can keep up with human consumption.
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The answer to where resource scarcity, 40 Russia all made first-time ever visits to Antarctica. A U.S. president has yet to do so.
The commonly held perception that the U.S. is a leader in space capability and presence has led to a policy in which we resist engagement in international regimes in the space domain. Our intent is to avoid commitments that might interfere from near-future expressions of sovereignty or freedom of action. The reality is that the space domain is less mature than we would like to think, and that like Antarctica of today, international regimes preserve our interests until such time as economic forces and technological capability make resolving such issues a necessity. Rather than worry about the imminent militarization of space or the need to defend against the potential capability of others, we would be wiser to pursue an arms control approach for now and redirect our resources into developing basic access capability and promote cooperation.
Ineffectual pursuit of military space dominance carries high opportunity costs. At the most basic level, the U.S. attitude has hindered efforts to develop strong international rules to minimize space debris, manage space traffic, and allocate orbital slots in GEO. The U.S. attitude has been a major obstacle to the most efficient and equitable approach to space-based navigation services-a single system operated as a global public utility with decision-making control shared among international partners. The U.S. position currently also precludes any realistic strategy for truly transformational uses of space.
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Commercial potential has barely been identified much less exerted its economic pressure on the marketplace. However in this regard Russian space tourist activities and U.S. commercial space station servicing contracts may be the vanguard of a new industry. We must be careful not to undercut fledging commercial ventures such as SpaceX with duplicative government financed initiatives. Doing so will neither spur private investment nor achieve lowered costs as was painfully demonstrated by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program which pressed forward with the simultaneous development of the Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicles to the economic detriment of both. Properly nurtured, a commercial space industry could create a tremendous engine for economic growth that bringing great competitive advantage over strictly state sponsored space programs. Renowned futurist George Friedman has postulated that a commercial space power industry will bring a fundamental paradigm in geopolitical realities.
Since the start of the industrial revolution, industry has guzzled energy, which was accidentally and haphazardly distributed around the world. The Arabian Peninsula, which otherwise had little importance, became crucially important because of its oil fields. With the shift to space-based systems, industry will produce energy instead of simply consuming it. Space travel will be the result of industrialization, and an industrialized nation will produce energy at the same time as it fuels its industry. Space will become more important than Saudi Arabia ever was . . . . For now, it is important to acknowledge our limits; U.S. ability to send humans into space is tenacious and restricted to low earth orbit, and our human presence on the International Space Station will count for little in future sovereignty assertions. It is our commercial enterprises, the dominance of our navigation and communication satellite networks and the nascent private launch initiatives that embody presence and capability in the global commons of space. 
Engagement preserves a nation's interest in international regimes
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The National Defense Strategy identifies engagement as a force multiplier since our partners may be able to provide resources, knowledge, skills, and capabilities that we cannot duplicate.
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Within the Maritime Strategy we find the key tenant for leveraging engagement; that although our forces can surge when necessary, trust and cooperation cannot be surged, rather they must be built over time so that strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.
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"Today, the United States and its partners find themselves competing for global influence in an era in which they are unlikely to be fully at war or fully at peace."
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This state of affairs can only be managed through perpetual engagement. In the range of military operations, such engagement corresponds to security cooperation and the manner in which strategic guidance is translated into action is through campaign plans. What follows then is a high level outline presenting the significant lines of effort of a campaign plan to ensure our long-term interests in the global commons.
Engage in the Maritime Regime. UNCLOS has proven to be one of the most widespread and enduring international regimes that has been expanded so that it applies in some way to all 55 terrestrial global commons. From resource extraction to pollution to maritime security, it is the principle means by which the nations of the world engage in the commons of the seas. It has also become the tool and the venue by which sovereignty in the Arctic is being determined and will likely serve a similar role when the question arises in Antarctica. For now, uncontested control of the sea by the U.S. Navy affords us the luxury of not entering into the constraints of this international regime. Understandably we treasure our complete freedom of action that unchallenged presence and capability in the maritime domain allows. It remains to be seen how long we can sustain this status quo. However, even under present circumstances, this notion of complete freedom is an illusion because we have accepted UNCLOS as international law, thus concluding on some practical level that greater national interests must be served by doing so.
Thus, the ratification of this treaty has become the one specific engagement directive explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy. As pointed out in U.S. Arctic Policy, "Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain. Accession will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the United States a seat at the This is a somewhat contrary and unnecessary position. The fact is that unlike the NW Passage, most international straits are long established, heavily used and well recognized by international regimes, important factors under UNCLOS. The precedent set by declaring the NW Passage to be historical inland waters is unlikely to significantly upset other waterways, especially given current U.S. capability and presence in the maritime domain and the current minimal utility of the NW Passage. Supporting a sovereignty claim will be a much more difficult proposition the longer we wait, and as pointed out by none less than the former U.S. ambassador to Canada, "It is in the security interest of the United States that it be under the control of Canada."
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Having the Northwest Passage recognized as Canadian internal waters would help to prevent the illegal entry of people and goods into North America. Within internal waters, the full force of the coastal state's immigration, customs and criminal laws apply, and foreign vessels, crews, passengers and cargo can be closely scrutinized. Cargo manifests and crew and passenger lists can be required in advance, as can visas, in the same manner as on land. In contrast, the right of transit passage has almost absolute precedence in an international strait. Under the UNCLOS, the coastal state may adopt laws concerning "the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in contravention of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations." But even these laws "shall not . . . have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage.
Recognizing that despite its presence, Canada has limited capability to monitor and control the passage, our two nations should enter into a joint jurisdiction agreement, as part of the negotiation to recognize sovereignty. The logical arrangement would be for the U.S. to assume responsibility for the western approaches to the NW Passage and for the two countries to share law enforcement responsibilities within the passage. One proposal, put forward by the Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, is the creation of a cooperative, treaty-based North West
Passage Authority (NWPA) that will allow Canada and the U.S. to manage the NWP jointly and negotiate resolutions to conflicting claims, just as they did in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
Seaway in the past. Step up engagement with Greenland. Rich in natural resources and with an ice-sheet in full retreat, Greenland is experiencing increasing productivity, income, and ambition. In June 2009
Greenland voted for extended self-government, just short of independence from Denmark.
Although Denmark still provides an annual subsidy to Greenland, that amount will fall as income from mineral extraction rises. When the subsidy reaches zero, many in Greenland expect a referendum on independence.
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Undoubtedly, there will remain strong incentives to preserve ties with Denmark and the European Union has already identified the strategic goal to enhan
Arctic-related cooperation with Greenland, stating,"[a]dditional efforts should be envisaged to make the EU an even more important partner for Greenland in managing its fragile environment and the challenges confronting its population."
Similarly, the U.S. should begin actively courting Greenland's favor, as we have interests ranging from mineral and fish resources to security concerns over approaches to the NW Passage and maintenance of our airbase in Thule.
Arguably, the Inuit population forms the basis for closer cultural ties to North America than Europe and the physical proximity of the island suggests shared perspectives on the environment and a potential lucrative trading partner. Extending the notion of a holistic approach, the U.S.
should seek to incorporate Greenland into a greater North American economic and security block.
Engage non-traditional partners. Development of sovereignty into the global commons will create the need or opportunity to engage non-traditional partners, like Greenland. This is particularly true with respect to Antarctica. The U.S. can leverage some because they are already strong partners elsewhere (e.g. South Korea) and only now are beginning to engage in Antarctica.
While with others we may be able to use Antarctica to enhance partnerships that may prove useful to us elsewhere as well. Beyond the question of political values, the two countries share a number of other traditions that are likely to draw them together on global commons in the future. These include their adherence to the common law tradition that offers predictability and prevents large-scale legal misadventures by the state. The respect for property rights is another feature that will come in handy for cooperative thinking about global commons. The growing interpenetration of the two economies in the knowledge and information technology sectors makes them natural partners in devising a regime for the cyber commons, on which a large and growing part of the two economies rely. More broadly, as India becomes a major power, its worldview could become increasingly similar to the Anglo-American traditions on openness and rule of law in the global commons. India either has or is acquiring the major attributes of the successful Anglo-Saxon model entrepreneurial capitalism, liberal democracy, and a maritime orientation.
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The recently released National Military Strategy provides an opportunity to capitalize on this An argument can be made that Australia and New Zealand, both proximal, claimant nations with stronger ties to the U.S. and the major USAP logistic route, justifies the current command arrangement. However a shift in COCOM would ensure that U.S. engagement in Antarctica does not suffer as the result of security demands in East Asia commanding priority of USPACOM attention. In redrawing the COCOM map SOUTHCOM should be given 71 Mohan, "Rising India," 13. 72 benefits more than any other nation from the Antarctic Treaty and that, "The potential for international discord and conflict over Antarctica that would exist absent the Treaty is, if anything, greater now than when it was negotiated."
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Unquestionably, the complete dissolution of an international regime would leave an undesired vacuum of governance and sovereignty in a global commons. However, we need not default to an unthinking and endless endorsement of a status quo which is likely to be unsustainable, rather, a modification of the existing regime is something that might very well be in U.S. interests. Currently, the Madrid Protocol, enacted in 1998, prohibits mineral extraction activities, other than for scientific purposes for 50 years.
Given the pace at which events in the Arctic have unfolded and the increasing press of resource demand and climate change, it is likely that this agreement will be challenged before it expires.
There are three reasons the U.S. is better served by addressing regime modification sooner rather than later; (1) at a time when national research bases in Antarctica are proliferating, the U.S. is by far the dominate actor in terms of presence and capability, this affords greater influence and puts the U.S. closer than others in terms of desire and ability to accomplish extraction; (2) nations are quickly realizing the need to secure an interest in the Antarctic and are rapidly joining the Treaty System which requires consensus for change or action, making such consensus more difficult and unlikely to attain, and thus the treaty less effective as governing regime; (3) the present regime relies largely on self-enforcement which is not contentious when there are few 74 Buck, The Global Commons, 62. 75 Buck, The Global Commons, 51. 76 Clinton, 2. infractions, however in time, questionable violations will raise tensions and complicate negotiations. Making even incremental revisions in the regime structure will be a protracted process of engaging new partners, and shaping, sharing, selling, and securing a new world-view.
Trying to expedite this process can be counterproductive so our effort must start soon. We should not underestimate the maturity of this domain. In Antarctica the ice is melting and the future will be here sooner than we expect.
Shift our posture on space regimes. Unlike Antarctica, we have overestimated the maturity of the space domain and our ability to exert sovereignty in that commons. It has led us to assume a posture that rejects international governance regimes and instead advocates U.S. dominance to achieve space superiority.
The United States was the principal sponsor of the original rules but has become the principal obstacle to their legal elaboration. In order to protect efforts to develop ballistic missile defense, the United States has refused since the 1980s to consider explicit rules prohibiting deliberate attack on space objects and the deployment of weapons in space. It has assertively blocked formal attempts to organize negotiations on those topics and has stood virtually alone against the rest of the world in doing so.
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A realistic assessment of our capabilities and presence in space, though unmatched except by a few space-faring nations, suggests this position should be reversed. The development of international regimes and treaties can effectively govern the uses of space for peaceful purposes, while preventing weaponization, especially during those formative years when capability and presence is limited. Therefore the United States should take the lead in promoting such agreements versus maintaining the belief that international treaties and regimes not backed by incentives, disincentives, and sanctions are not likely to be enforceable.
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Whatever lead we enjoy among nations in space can be constructively used to assume leadership and exert influence over a process to craft more a more expansive international regime.
If the constructive use of space does unavoidably require international accommodation, as originally presumed, and if the pursuit of assertive national dominance is recognized as both unrealistic and provocative, then a major reformulation of current U.S. policy will be necessary and will require serious consideration of enhanced legal protection built upon the principles and legal obligations of the OST. If defeating belligerent reactions to an assertive policy of dominance is not feasible, then preventing such reactions by conveying credible reassurance, which almost certainly would require legally binding commitments, becomes vital. . . . If dominance is not possible, enhanced legal protection is not merely a necessary concession to other countries but rather the predominant interest of the United States itself.
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In our newest strategic document, there is a tantalizing suggestion that the military may be slowly acknowledging the need to shift our space posture. Previous discussions of dominance and freedom of action have given way to an endorsement of, " . . . whole-of-nation approaches to establishing and promoting norms, enhancing space situational awareness, and fostering greater transparency and information sharing."
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It is an important start but falls short of embracing international regime participation and developing commercial space enterprise.
Establish a national space objective that serves a broad array of strategic interests. There are some who advocate that deflecting asteroids from impacting Earth is an essential capability to ensure the safety of the human race; unquestionably this is a low risk but high consequence event.
There are others who advocate that the robotic search for life in the universe is one of the few essential questions to be answered; unquestionably discovering whether life exists elsewhere, or not, would profoundly change our perception of what it means to be human. Then there are those who advocate for leaving Earth's cradle and establishing a colony on Mars as the stepping stone to ensure the continuity of our species; unquestionably such ambition nourishes the human spirit and lifts our civilization. But I will advocate an alternative goal. It is predicated on the assumption that our next endeavor in the space domain must meet a wide array of requirements in order to receive the support it will need over the time that will be required. These are: That presents an exploitable natural resource in an unclaimed commons that will become increasingly difficult to ignore. The basic idea is very straightforward: place very large solar arrays into continuously and intensely sunlit Earth orbit (1,366 watts/m2) in order to collect gigawatts of electrical energy which is electromagnetically beamed to Earth and received on the surface for use either as baseload power via direct connection to the existing electrical grid, conversion into manufactured synthetic hydrocarbon fuels, or as low-intensity broadcast power beamed directly to consumers (see Appendix A, Figure 7 ).
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Some will say that space based solar power is science fiction, but no more so than the ISS was twenty years ago, or the space shuttle was forty years ago or a moon landing was sixty years ago. A stretch goal to be sure but not a fantasy and carries with it the benefit of, " . . . energy security, economic development, improved environmental stewardship, advancement of general space faring, and overall national security for those nations who construct and possess a SBSP capability."
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This represents a space objective worthy of our nation's collective effort and a very logical step technically, financially, and strategically from where we are today. Our government should encourage and fund a collaborative effort between the military and civilian communities to take the next prudent step via an incremental research and development program that culminates with a space-borne proof-of-concept demonstration in the next decade.
Cyberspace domain is poised to be the next global commons
The creation of cyberspace invented a new domain. Though it is often referred to as, and assumed to be, a global commons, it does not meet the criteria established for commons. As yet, 81 Lewis, "Powering the Planet," 22. it is an ungoverned space, one in which some regulation has been inconsistently applied and haphazardly enforced but where no agreed upon international regime has formed. It is the high seas in the days of sail, the polar regions before the arrival of intrepid Victorian era explorers and the vast sanctity of space before the trespass of Sputnik. It remains to be seen whether that domain is a global commons that will become subject to an international management regime and ultimately, to expressions of sovereignty.
The development of sovereignty in the sea, air, and outer space domains were all distinct, yet shared significant similarities. These similarities, in turn, provide significant insights into how sovereignty can develop in the cyberspace domain as well. First, the development of sovereignty in cyberspace requires an international regime. Second, states must critically assess their interests in cyberspace, because those interests will eventually trump the desires of those actors who want cyberspace to remain free from state sovereignty. Third, current state practice regarding the concept of sovereignty in cyberspace, as well as how a state responds to violations of its sovereignty in cyberspace, will influence how, and if, an international regime governing sovereignty in cyberspace ultimately develops. Fourth, the capability to identify specific actors in cyberspace will become an important requirement. Finally, a state must be able to exert control of cyberspace and respond to those actors who violate its sovereignty in cyberspace. Obama, National Security Strategy, 50. cyberspace follows the example set by other global commons remains to be seen. According to a BBC poll taken in August 2010, four out of five people around the world believe that access to the Internet is a fundamental human right, although greater differences emerge over the degree to which it should be regulated.
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A further step in that direction was taken in June 2011 when a United Nations report declared that, "facilitating access to the Internet for all individuals, with as little restriction to online content as possible, should be a priority for all States."
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In acknowledging the criminal opportunities available in cyberspace, the report laid out a framework for states to safeguard the Internet while instituting checks against using such pretenses to suppress freedom of expression. Such guidelines and recommendations may be the beginnings of an international regulatory regime which would advance cyberspace on the path toward becoming a true Global Commons.
Conclusion
Contrary to the popular conception that global commons are simply ungoverned spaces beyond the borders of state sovereignty, the air, sea, polar, and space domains share particular characteristics that create a specific entity known as a Global Common. These characteristics define the physical boundaries of the commons and place some constraints on the expression of sovereignty within those boundaries so as to be able to institute an international regime that will restrict the actions and guarantee the rights of all participants collectively. Despite our strength, unilateral action will become increasingly more difficult and less effective.
As new centers or poles of power emerge in the international arena, they will demand a greater say in how the seas, cyberspace, and outer space are used and governed. Competing views about the use and governance of exclusive maritime economic zones, for example, led to a series of naval encounters between U.S. and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea in 2009. The Indian Navy, cutting through the legalistic restraints on piracy interdiction observed by the Western powers, sank a pirate vessel off the coast of Somalia 2008, upholding a more ancient standard of naval governance in the process.
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We must hone our practice of engagement; an occasionally indirect tool that requires patience and a sustained clear vision. Securing our interests in the global commons is unlikely if our efforts are re-directed every four years and our strategy consists of compromises on acquisition The heavy black line shows humanity's primary power consumption in the "business as usual" scenario. The red lines show the carbon-based power consumption reductions needed to stabilize atmospheric CO 2 at various levels. 
